Emerging Health Issues in Canada, Essay Example

Is poverty in Canada influenced by racial stratification? Do non-white communities in Canada experience poverty at a higher rate than white Canadians? In fact, the literature indicates that the answer to these questions is a resounding Yes: non-white Canadians experience higher rates of poverty than white Canadians, a pattern that is especially marked in comparisons of the outcomes of white versus non-white immigrant communities. Income inequality and wage differentials are observable by occupation, and even accounting for a great many economic factors, much of the inequality cannot be accounted for by performance differences. What all of this indicates is the need for bold new policies and approaches to resolve the wage differential by eliminating racial discrimination.

In Canada, the inequalities of poverty are compounded by inequalities of race. In fact, race compounds measures of inequality even in the presence of other factors that contribute to inequality: Banerjee (2009) found that while immigrants in general exhibited significant disparities of income compared to native-born white Canadians, non-white immigrants, so-called ‘visible minorities’ (i.e. visibly non-white), lagged behind the white immigrants as well (pp. 474-475). This pattern was observed despite the fact that both groups of immigrants, the white immigrants and the visible minority immigrants, were relatively recent, having resided in Canada for about 5 years (p. 475). Both groups also trailed native-born white Canadians in work experience (p. 475).

Moreover, in 1999, both groups were covered by collective agreements at lower rates than the native-born, though the visible minority immigrants had the lowest rates of coverage by collective agreements, at 13.2% (Banerjee, 2009, p. 475). By way of comparison, white immigrants who had been in Canada for a similar length of time were covered by collective agreements at a rate of 26.2%, and native-born white Canadians were covered by collective agreements at a rate of 35.8% (p. 475). By 2004, visible minorities in the sample were covered by collective agreements at a rate of 20.2%, still far behind the rate for native-born white Canadians, while white immigrants had essentially assimilated, with a rate of coverage standing at 34.1% (p. 475).

This is, if anything, the more ironic in light of another set of statistics comparing rates of university education amongst the three groups—white native-born Canadians, white recent immigrants, and visible minority recent immigrants. According to Banerjee (2009), in 1999 native-born white Canadians held university degrees at a rate of about 20%, compared with 28% of recent white immigrants and 32% of recent visible minority immigrants (p. 475). However, the figures for college education were very different: here, white recent immigrants led with a rate of 36.1%, followed by native-born whites with a rate of 32.9%, and then visible minority recent immigrants with a rate of 18.0% (p. 475). By 2004, the visible minority immigrants’ lead with regard to the possession of university degrees had increased, growing about 5 percentage points to 37%, while white recent immigrants and native-born whites both held university degrees at lower rates, 30.1% and 23.2% respectively (p. 476). The figures for college diplomas are similarly interesting: by 2004, white recent immigrants held college diplomas at much higher rates, 46.8%, an increase of nearly 10 percentage points, while visible minority recent immigrants held them at the rate of 23.9%, an increase of about 6 percentage points (p. 476). Finally, native-born whites held college diplomas at a rate of about 37%, an increase of 4 percentage points (p. 476).

Finally, visible minority immigrants were the most likely to report having a first language other than English or French (Banerjee, 2009, p. 476). Banerjee found that “over 90% of visible minority recent immigrants” had a first language besides English or French, compared with some 66% of white recent immigrants (p. 476). For comparison, a mere 5% of native-born white Canadians reported having a first language that was neither English nor French (p. 476). However, having a non-official first language affected the different groups in different ways: for native-born white Canadians, having a first language other than English or French was associated with slightly better income prospects, while both groups of immigrants, white and visible minority, were adversely affected by having a first language other than English or French (p. 480). However, among immigrants the effects varied tremendously by race: for white immigrants, having a non-official language resulted in an annual income decrease of 23 percentage points, for visible minority recent immigrants having a non-official first language resulted in a decrease of 40 percentage points (p. 480).

What Banerjee (2009) found was that in fact, the income inequality was characterized by a very deep racial disparity: though both white and visible minority recent immigrants evinced quite significant disparities in income with native-born whites in 1999, there was a deeply racialized disparity in income growth from 1999 to 2004 (p. 278). As Banerjee explained: “While white recent immigrants experience above average income growth and nearly close the income gap by 2004, visible minority recent immigrants are unable to catch-up to native-born whites during the six years of the panel” (p. 278).

Further attestation that income inequality in Canada follows racial lines can be found in the work of Fearon and Wald (2011). Drawing upon information from the 2006 Canadian census, these authors found a wage gap of about $12,400 between white and black Canadians, a figure that was produced by standardizing productive endowments (p. 327). Of this $12,400 gap, about one-fifth, or $2,600, was found to be attributed to “productivity-related endowment differences”, leaving the remaining four-fifths, some $9,800, accounted for by “occupational segregation and wage discrimination” (p. 327). More specifically, black employees were disproportionately employed in low-income positions, and underrepresented in high-income positions (p. 327). A mere 7.3% of black workers held managerial positions, compared with the expected proportional figure of 13.3% (p. 327). Conversely, 7.7% of black employees held jobs in the elemental service occupations, compared with the proportionally expected 5.3% (p. 327).

Immigrant status and language also deleteriously affected outcomes for blacks compared with whites, exacerbating the disparities of income (Fearon & Wald, 2011, p. 330). In fact, the vast majority of black workers in the sample were immigrants: 76.4% of black male employees, and 75.9% of black female employees (p. 330). This is compared to much smaller percentages amongst the white workers: 10.7% of white male employees and 10.1% of white female employees were immigrants (p. 330). Moreover, in 2005 about 67.1% of black male employees and 72.3% of black female employees had either English or French as a mother tongue, compared with about 85% for white workers of both genders (p. 330).

From the above it might be thought that the answer to the causes of the income inequality between blacks and whites is obvious: the vastly higher proportion of blacks in the sample who are immigrants, not to mention the lower rates of having English or French as a mother tongue. However, the income inequality persists even within occupations: for example, “Black managers earned 69.4 per cent of White managers’ earnings, whereas Blacks who worked in elemental services, earned 92.7 per cent of their White counterparts” (Fearon & Wald, 2011, p. 332). Furthermore, there were gender differences, too: comparisons of the earnings of Black males with White males and Black females with White females revealed a much larger gap between the former pair than the latter (p. 332). While Black females achieved near-parity with White females in many occupations, including “professionals, supervisory, clerical and sales”, Black males lagged behind White males in all occupations (p. 332). Indeed, Fearon and Wald found that the majority of the income disparity could not be accounted for by productive endowments: out of a $240.66 total weekly earnings gap between blacks and whites, only $99.15, or 41.2%, could be accounted for by differences in productivity, leaving $141.15 (58.8%) that could only be attributed to wage discrimination (p. 337).

As Kazemipur and Halli (2001) explained, poverty in Canada has often been framed in terms of the rather erroneous idea that it is no more severe amongst immigrants than it is amongst the native-born (p. 219). Indeed, the assimilation thesis holds that immigrant poverty is a passing phenomenon: caused by immigrants’ adjustment problems, it will pass as they assimilate into the fabric of Canadian society (p. 220). Another idea, the human capital thesis, emphasizes the importance of acquiring human capital endowments, including education and job skills (p. 221). Of course, discrimination is another explanation: the idea that immigrants have experienced outright discrimination that has contributed to their ongoing marginalization (pp. 221-222).

What Kazemipur and Halli (2001) found anticipated Banerjee’s (2009) findings: immigrants have higher rates of poverty than non-immigrants, and visible minority immigrants experience higher rates of poverty than do European-origin immigrants (pp. 225-227). Moreover, the most disadvantaged groups all had something else in common: in every case, “the majority of them arrived in Canada since the late 1960s”, after the postwar economic boom, and recently enough that they can still be classified as relatively recent immigrants (p. 227). Consequently, the period in which the immigrants came is still exerting considerable influence on their employment outcomes and place in Canadian society, and it can quite reasonably be expected that the passage of time will ameliorate at least some of these disparities (pp. 227-229).

However, other findings were less encouraging: Kazemipur and Halli (2001) found evidence for powerful social forces working to keep immigrants, especially non-white immigrants, in low socioeconomic conditions (pp. 230-231). To no small degree, this phenomenon appears to be one of path-dependence: poor, non-white immigrant communities experience low returns from education, and low upward mobility, ensuring a perpetuation of the cycle inter-generationally (p. 231). And, too, the authors found evidence that blacks had higher rates of poverty amongst both native-born Canadians and immigrants, although all visible minority immigrants—but not all visible minority native-born Canadians—had higher rates of poverty (p. 134).

As Yap and Konrad (2009) explained, the “sticky floor” hypothesis holds that systemic gender and racial disparities will be most pronounced at the lowest levels of the organizational hierarchy, while the “glass ceiling” hypothesis holds that they are most pronounced at the highest levels (p. 595). The mid-level bottleneck must also be accounted for: in no small number of organizations, indeed the majority, a college degree is usually required for promotions beyond the level of first-line supervisor (p. 596). These authors found a significant disparity between whites and blacks in terms of promotions, with 59.4% of whites and 55.7% of non-whites receiving at least one promotion (p. 600).

Overall, the results were very revealing: even accounting for “an extensive list of supply-side, demand-side, and control variables,” white males had proportionally higher rates of promotion than their white female, minority male, and minority female counterparts (Yap & Konrad, 2009, p. 605). White females lagged white males in likelihood of being promoted by 4.5%; for minority males, the figure was 7.9%, and for minority females, 16% (p. 605). What this indicates, plainly and very clearly, is that discrimination lies at the root of a great deal of the disparity in incomes along racial and gender lines: there is a glass ceiling, and/or a sticky floor, which is the basis for the structural inequality observed.

How, then, might this issue be reframed with an eye towards reform? The answer is not as difficult as it might seem. Banerjee (2009) noted that several things work against non-white immigrants, in particular: “education, work experience, unionization and first language” (p. 481). Moreover, even their education does not seem to count as favorably as it does for non-whites—and the reason for this seems to be that “Canadian employers especially view non-university post-secondary institutions from regions outside of North America and Europe as being of inferior quality or less relevance in the Canadian context” (pp. 481-482). What is needed, then, is to help immigrants, especially non-white immigrants, be able to translate their education and any relevant experience into the Canadian occupational context. This is the central way in which this problem needs to be reframed: translating education and work experience through cultural filters, including Canadian prejudices. Any policies framed towards this end for immigration services should help immigrants with their resumes, and also provide contacts to non-profit groups and community organizations that might be able to help them find gainful employment that would be relatively appropriate for their education and work experience background.

Of course, for native-born non-white Canadians, the situation is similar in some ways and yet different again in others. From the evidence presented, it does indeed appear that a considerable degree of racial (and gender) discrimination is occurring in the Canadian workplace. Here, advocacy groups should focus on pressuring businesses to be more transparent in their hiring and promotion decisions, publishing reports that note the relative percentages of white versus non-white employees, and men and women, for any given company operating in Canada. These figures could be compared with both the general population in the area(s) of recruitment, accounting for demand- and supply-side figures, and similar companies where applicable. The resulting rankings would facilitate greater public awareness of the organizations that are, and are not, hiring and promoting equitably. Such an effort could also serve as the springboard for a grassroots coalition effort of NGOs and community organizations to pressure policymakers to pass those laws which are needful to ensure full racial and gender equality in the workplace.

The way to solve the racial disparities of poverty in Canada is to address the problem at its source: systemic and structural inequality, facilitated by a considerable dose of racism and bigotry. By so doing, activists can pressure both private entities and policymakers to make the changes needed to ensure a more level playing field for all Canadians. By exposing and eliminating racial discrimination in the Canadian workplace, the way will be clear for an elimination of racial differences in levels of poverty.

References

Banerjee, R. (2009). Income growth of new immigrants in Canada: Evidence from the survey of labour and income dynamics. Relations Industrielles/Industrial Relations, 64(3), pp. 466-488. Retrieved from http://www.search.ebscohost.com/

Fearon, G., & Wald, S. (2011). The earnings gap between Black and White workers in Canada: Evidence from the 2006 census. Relations Industrielles/Industrial Relations, 66(3), pp. 324-348. Retrieved from http://www.search.ebscohost.com/

Kazemipur, A., & Halli, S. S. (2001). The changing colour of poverty in Canada. Canadian Review of Sociology & Anthropology, 38(2), pp. 217-238. Retrieved from http://www.search.ebscohost.com/

Yap, M., & Konrad, A. M. (2009). Gender and racial differentials in promotions: Is there a sticky floor, a mid-level bottleneck, or a glass ceiling? Relations Industrielles/Industrial Relations, 64(4), pp. 593-619. Retrieved from http://www.search.ebscohost.com/