Philosophy’s (Lack of) Concern With the Under-Representation of Minorities, Essay Example

The sense in which there is an under-representation of various minority groups, such as women, disabled, and people of colour, within professional philosophy becomes problematic insofar as it in indicates a certain systematic problem, whereby the phenomenon of white male dominance within the profession speaks to a deeper social discourse that creates this situation. To the extent that one excludes the possibility that white males are somehow more capable in the field of philosophy, and thus, that their representation is in this regard justified – what appears to be an untenable thesis, based not only on empirical data, but also on sociological grounds – the etiology behind this phenomenon suggests precisely the working of such a social discourse, which has structured the philosophical environment in such a manner. Accordingly, this phenomenon should be of concern to philosophers if philosophers remain committed to not only examining the world around them, but moreover changing it. Under-representation indicates that there is a certain social structure that encourages these various representations within the field of philosophy, such that it becomes a phenomenon which needs to be examined and not go unnoticed if philosophy is truly a discipline of radical questioning and critique. The ignorance towards such representation within philosophy itself could only be viewed as a transgression of that, which philosophy itself performs in its best moments: an attentiveness to the apparent phenomena that structure our existence.

As McIntosh suggests, there is a clear sense in which what she terms the phenomenon of “white privilege” refuses to be acknowledged within academia. Hence, “denials that amount to taboos surround the subject of advantages that men gain from women’s disadvantages.” (McIntosh, 1) The utilization of the concept of taboo is arguably of crucial importance, since McIntosh identifies a socially conditioned response to under-representation.. The phenomenon of such white privilege in the field of philosophy is an issue of which one is not to speak. This profound silence on the issue can be identified as problematic in two main respects. Firstly, it becomes inconceivable that such taboos should in fact exist, precisely within the discipline of philosophy according to its continued historical commitment, from Plato onwards, to the exposure of the workings of social discourse. This taboo creates the illusion that somehow philosophy is oblivious to the workings of this social discourse: it ignores, following McIntosh, the real social and material conditions that make philosophizing possible. That is, from a certain Marxist perspective, what is important to note is there are very real social structures and discourses operative which create their own particular social world, such as that of the professional philosopher. To view philosophy as exempt from this same process is to essentially reify philosophy, viewing it as a form of mythical transcendence that is completely unrelated to the real world. This arguably marks a complete failure of philosophical reflection, when considering what the discipline tries and has tried to accomplish. This notion is consistent with McIntosh’s, insofar as she considers that a certain emancipatory and greater ethical project, committed to forms of social justice, is consistent with philosophy: “To redesign social systems we need first to acknowledge their colossal unseen dimensions.” (6) The project of social justice is thus radically compromised by the failure to acknowledge such disproportionate representation. It is a failure to think philosophically about (professional) philosophy itself. The formulation of new social forms that benefit ethical principles thus remain largely hypocritical, since the philosophers who advance these social alternatives fail to see the greater ideology that has put them in a position to advance these very alternatives. What MacIntosh called “colossal unseen dimensions” suggests a concept of ideology, whereby the dominant social discourse exists on an unconscious level, such that one cannot see phenomena such as social misrepresentation; even when it is discerned, it remains taboo. This synthesis of the unconscious operation of ideology and taboo is precisely what philosophy should endeavor to surface in its discourse.

Such a social discourse and its hegemonic effects are identified by Lloyd as the corollaries of what she terms “the Man of Reason.” This is a particular social discursive formation, according to which “the rationalist philosophies of the seventeenth century” (Code, 18) lead to the prejudiced equation of the rational mind with “maleness.” (Code, 18) This is a historical tradition, according to which the aim is to promote the “associations between ‘male’ and ‘rational’.” (Code, 18) The impact of this association in regards to philosophy is clear, insofar as if philosophy is posited as an activity of rationality, the association of the male with rationality will engender the privileged position of the male within philosophy. Accordingly, phenomenon such as misrepresentation within philosophy is precisely a symptom of this rational association. The increased presence of males in philosophy is an extension of the myth of rationality and its maleness that Codes identifies. It is clear that such a situation should be unacceptable for the philosopher, as this is an uncritical prejudiced image of the philosopher, one that seems to jar with what philosophy entails at its most basic level. This is not to say that philosophy should be essentialized, and that philosophy is always X. Rather, philosophy’s heightened awareness to its situation, its greater attunement to the world around it, an attunement that always feeds off the pre-condition of a radical questioning, suggests that the ignorance of the affectivity of the false connection between rationality and the male is concomitantly an ignorance of philosophy itself.

This critique therefore suggests that current structures of professional philosophy are a product of an ideology and discourse, which are fragmentary and exclusionary, as manifested in disproportionate representations of whites. The failure to be conscious of this very social structure is an indictment for philosophy’s potential for practical and social change. Furthermore, as McIntosh notes, any new social forms that philosophy tries to be offered lose their potency when considering that professional philosophy itself occurs within a fragmented and non-egalitarian environment. That philosophy is concerned with this problem is thus not only a concern with the greater social world, but a question of the concern with the function of philosophy itself in the space of contemporary discourse and the greater social mechanism.

Works Cited

Lloyd, Genevieve. “The Man of Reason.” Metaphilosophy. Vol. 10, No. 1, 1979. pp. 18-37.

McIntosh, Peggy. “White Privilege: Unpacking the Invisible Knapsack.” Independent School. Wellesely, MA: Wellesley College. pp. 1-7.