Port Security, Research Paper Example

Introduction

Prior to the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, American seaports were not subject to comprehensive governmental oversight[1]. The attacks, however, prompted the U.S. government to reevaluate the security systems of the nation’s transportation systems. In addition to conveyances and vessels, this reevaluation extended to the security personnel that managed port security[2]. This paper will examine port security within the U.S. by addressing its historical context and modern changes that occurred in light of the 9/11 attacks.

Discussion

Port security includes the law, defense, and treaty enforcement implemented to counter terrorism activities that occur within the port or maritime domain[3]. Port security therefore includes the security of seaports, maritime security, and comprehensive inspections of all cargo that passes through the ports. The International Maritime Organization governs international ports. The United States has also developed a series of de facto international port security programs, such as the Customs Trade Partnership against Terrorism and the Container Security Initiative[4]. The U.S. Customs and Border Protection and the Coast Guard administer national port security. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security governs these organizations and periodically collaborates with the Federal Bureau of Investigations and other law enforcement agencies to patrol and protect national seaports.

In 2006, P&O Ports (a British firm) and all its American port assets were sold to Dubai Ports World. This was a controversial sale because it posed a potential threat to national security. That same year, Dubai Ports sold it American assets to AIG, but even this sale did not console doomsayers about potential threats. As such, U.S. Congress implemented the SAFE Port Act (H.R. 4954) in 2006[5].

Safe Port Act

On October 13, 2006, Congress enacted the Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006, to regulate port security[6]. Congress also added an online gambling clause at the last minute. As mentioned before, the Dubai Ports transaction sparked fears among Americans that American ports would fall in the hands of foreign owners. In an effort to prevent that from happening, the House and Senate voted to alter the Exon-Florio Amendment. These changes were predicted to improve port security on national waters and included the following programs: (1) the establishment of the port security grant program, (2) the implementation of the customs trade partnership against terrorism, (3) the creation of the transportation worker identification credential, (4) the creation of the container security initiative, and (5) the founding of interagency operational centers for port security[7].

The Act was also instrumental in the creation of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office and in the allocation of funds toward the Integrated Deepwater System Program. The latter refers to a long-term U.S. Coast Guard program designed to modernize the organization’s tools, vehicles, and facilities.

Port Security

Due to the nature of their purpose, ports are vulnerable to terrorist attacks. The survival of the container shipping industry therefore depends on the safety of seaports. In the U.S. alone there are more than 300 river and sea ports that host more than 3,700 passenger and cargo terminals[8]. Global economies depend on commercial shipping, as it is the most cost-efficient and reliable means to transport merchandise. In addition, the U.S. is responsible for handling an estimated 20 percent of all global maritime trade[9]. Due to the volume of goods that pass through global ports daily, and due to its host nations’ dependence on its contribution to their economies, ports are desirable targets for terrorist attacks. An attack on any part of the maritime system could have a significant effect on the global economy, as well as on future trade. The most prominent threats that face ports are pirate attacks and ship hijackings.

The most vulnerable sector of port security pertains to cargo containers. These containers typically hold inventory worth up to $12 million at any given time. It remains a difficult task to inspect, track, and secure each container prior to entering and after leaving a port. The most feasible means to secure these containers is through thorough inspections. However, each inspection takes a significant amount of time, and costs associated with container inspection time-delays are often exorbitant. Some of the larger container ships are virtually impossible to inspect because they contain roughly 3,000 containers. In other words, if such a ship were to be inspected, that would mean that each container on the ship would be subject to subsequent inspections. This procedure could take very long and therefore disrupt shipment schedules. As such, only about two percent of the estimated six million containers that pass through U.S. ports annually are effectively inspected[10].

The most significant threat that ports face, therefore, pertains directly to inspection deficiencies. Security authorities within the shipping industry have voiced concerns that terrorists may gain access to container ships, or certain containers on these ships, to smuggle weapons of mass destruction. This threat is cause for concern because a nuclear detonation (similar to size or even smaller than the one used in Hiroshima) could potentially cause the deaths of nearly one million people[11]. Unfortunately, it is common knowledge that despite the level of security at major ports, merchandise will continue to be transported through them. In other words, even if security measures at global and national ports are improved, terrorists may still have enough opportunity for impure conduct. There are various key players that collaborate to ensure the safe and successful shipment of containers. For instance, in order to ship a container, the following key players depend on one another: the person who send the goods (the exporter), the person who receives the goods (the importer), and the freight forwarder, the customs broker, the excise inspectors, the truckers, the railroad workers, the dock workers, and the vessel crews (the middlemen). All these players work together to ensure that a container is successfully shipped from point A to point B. however, because there are so many middlemen involved in the process, terrorists have ample opportunity to intercept the shipping process at any given stage to compromise the integrity of its merchandise[12].

In addition to the actual containers that are at risk of being compromised by terrorists, the actual geographical locations of many ports are also at risk of terrorist attacks. Ports are generally very large and the administration of effective security is often a difficult enterprise. Some ports are located within densely populated urban areas. Due to the nature of its location, terrorists find it very easy to enter and exit these port locations. Due to the amount of traffic that goes in and out of ports on a daily basis, terrorists can easily infiltrate ports under the guise of port workers. For instance, terrorists may utilize some of the trucks that go in and out of ports to transport weapons of mass destruction for shipping containers into heavy populated urban areas (Slack and Fremont 2005). For instance, there is a large port in California, close to Los Angeles. Security deficiencies could allow terrorists to transport chemical explosives from that port into heavily populated areas of Los Angeles. Furthermore, when container ships arrive at ports, they are typically anchored for a period of time, while containers are emptied onto other vehicles for land transportation. While these container ships are anchored, they are vulnerable to hijackings or theft, because they are stationary targets. In addition, many vessel crew members are unarmed and would not be able to retaliate effectively in the case of an attack. If a stationary ship is attacked, it could halt the activity of the entire port, thereby causing severe economic damage[13].

Dennis O’Keefe, mayor of St. John’s in Canada suggested a large fence around a large portion of the St. John’s waterfront to protect the city from potential threats associated with ship containers that are connected with the offshore oil industry[14]. Currently, St. John’s waterfront port does not meet International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) regulations. This port is one of many that struggle to overcome barriers associated with improved port security measures. Increased security at St. John’s waterfront port is an essential measure to accommodate the influx of vessels associated with the offshore oil industry. It will also allow port authorities to improve security measures at the port. It is predicted that 2013 will see an increase in vessels connected to the gas and oil industry. Without proper certification and security measures, the port will not be allowed to accept these vessels and will subsequently suffer annual losses of up to $200 million[15]. In addition to fiscal losses, the city will also face a potential job loss of 3,000 workers annually. The proposed fence would cost an estimated $1 million to build, and will take up a significant part of the city’s geographical area surrounding the port. However, despite the price tag attached to such an endeavor, and the potential dismal aesthetics of a large fence, it would be beneficial to the port’s security and would increase business flow into the city.

Although this was not a hijacking or a terrorist attack, a recent labor-management dispute resulted in port closures, and gave insight into the economic impact that a port closure could have on a nation’s economy. In 2002, a series of labor disputes resulted in the closure of several ports along the west coast of the U.S. during the first five days of the disputes, the port closures cost the U.S. an estimated $1 billion each day[16]. The fiscal damage increased with each passing day until the dispute was settled. Similarly, in 1997 the International Longshore and Warehouse Union Strike lasted for 10 days, during which 29 west coast ports were closed. The port closures cost the U.S. an estimated $19.4 billion[17]. These fiscal losses indicate that port closures, due to whatever reason, have severe financial consequences for the host country.

The shipping industry employs a just-in-time distribution model, which allows for reduced inventory carrying costs. In other words, it allows for the shipment and arrival of new inventory, at the exact moment it is needed. In other words, products are only shipped if and when the importer demands it. This method is very cost effective and has resulted in a cost decrease of business logistics of nearly six percent since its implementation in 1980[18]. The downfall of this shipping method is that shipments are attached to exact times, which means it cannot afford delays due to inspections. As such, just-in-time shipments are vulnerable to security breaches. In the event that a port is closed due to an attack, or prolonged inspections, of labor strikes, incoming vessels are typically diverted to other ports. However, this also has an adverse economic impact because many of the ports receiving additional vessels operate at or over-capacity at that point, which means shipments are not delivered on time. In other words, any deviation in port operations can cause significant economic damage to a port and its host nation.

As mentioned before, there are several government-sponsored agencies involved with port security. However, state and local governments are predominantly responsible for the provision of port security. In essence, each state has the authority to impose laws and protective measures to protect the interests of its ports. This means that each state may assign law enforcement officials to protect its ports, and each port may assign its own security personnel to offer additional protection[19]. In addition to local security forces, the Customs and Border Protection, the Coast Guard, and the Transportation Security Administration are Federal Agencies under the jurisdiction of the Department of Homeland Security, employed to protect national ports. The Coast Guard’s role includes the inspection of incoming vessels, and the protection of vessels against terrorist threats. The Customs and Border Protection is responsible for cargo inspections of vessels that enter U.S. ports. These inspections also include that of the ship passengers and crew members. The Transportation Security Administration’s responsibility is responsible for the inspection of all vehicles (whether they travel by ground, air, or water) that enter U.S. territories[20]. In an effort to make these Federal agencies more effective, experts have suggested its consolidation. Such a consolidation would ensure prolonged benefits, such as continued and comprehensive protection. However, challenges, such as collaboration and funding have slowed down consolidation efforts. Collaboration challenges refer to the issue of ensuring effective coordination and cooperation among all agencies to establish a well-oiled security system. Funding issues center on determining how much funding and other resources are required to consolidate the various agencies.

Conclusion

The terrorist attacks of 9/11 prompted federal, state, and local agencies to improve security measures at U.S. ports. On improvement is evident in the Coast Guard’s efforts to enhance the quality and timing of vessels, so they may be easier to evaluate in the event of a terrorist threat. These improvements will allow for more time so that the Coast Guard can accurately identify incoming vessels. Customs and Border Protection has developed new programs to accurately identify and target vessels that may pose a potential threat to national security. Prior to the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, American seaports were not subject to comprehensive governmental oversight[21]. The attacks, however, prompted the U.S. government to reevaluate the security systems of the nation’s transportation systems. In addition to conveyances and vessels, this reevaluation extended to the security personnel that managed port security[22]. Global and national port security remains a difficult task to accomplish successfully; however, it is crucial that improved security measures are implemented on a timely basis. Failure to do so will have severe economic backlashes on the national and global economies.

Bibliography

Allen, C.H. Maritime Counterproliferation Operations and the Rule of Law. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007.

Cristopher, Kenneth. Port Security Management. New York: Auerbach Publications, 2009.

Frittelli, J.F. Port and Maritime Security: Background and Issues. New York: Novinka Books, 2003.

Graham, Edward Montgomery, and David Matthew Marchick. US national security and foreign direct investment. New York: Peterson Institute, 2006.

Greenberg, M.D. Maritime Terrorism: Risk and Liability. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006.

Levinson, M. The Box: How the Shipping Container Made the World Smaller and the World Economy Bigger. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006.

Nottebbom, T. “Container Shipping and Ports: An Overview.” Review of Network Economics 3, no. 2 (2004): 86-106.

Rodrigue, J-P., C. Comtois, and B. Slack. The Geography of Transport Systems. London: Routledge, 2006.

Slack, B., and A. Fremont. “Transformation of Port Terminal Operations: From the Local to the Global.” Transport Reviews 25, no. 1 (2005): 117-130.

Stopford, M. Maritime Economics (Second Edition). London: Routledge, 1997.

Updated News. “St. John’s harbour fence necessary for port security, says mayor.” updatednews.ca. December 10, 2012. http://updatednews.ca/2012/12/10/st-johns-harbour-fence-necessary-for-port-security-says-mayor/ (accessed December 10, 2012).

[1] Cristopher, Kenneth. Port Security Management. New York: Auerbach Publications, 2009.

[2] Cristopher, Kenneth. Port Security Management. New York: Auerbach Publications, 2009.

[3] Greenberg, M.D. Maritime Terrorism: Risk and Liability. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006.

[4] Greenberg, M.D. Maritime Terrorism: Risk and Liability. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006.

[5] Cristopher, Kenneth. Port Security Management. New York: Auerbach Publications, 2009.

[6] Graham, Edward Montgomery, and David Matthew Marchick. US national security and foreign direct investment. New York: Peterson Institute, 2006.

[7] Graham, Edward Montgomery, and David Matthew Marchick. US national security and foreign direct investment. New York: Peterson Institute, 2006.

[8] Frittelli, J.F. Port and Maritime Security: Background and Issues. New York: Novinka Books, 2003.

[9] Levinson, M. The Box: How the Shipping Container Made the World Smaller and the World Economy Bigger. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006.

[10] Levinson, M. The Box: How the Shipping Container Made the World Smaller and the World Economy Bigger. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006.

[11] Nottebbom, T. “Container Shipping and Ports: An Overview.” Review of Network Economics 3, no. 2 (2004): 86-106.

[12] Nottebbom, T. “Container Shipping and Ports: An Overview.” Review of Network Economics 3, no. 2 (2004): 86-106.

[13] Slack, B., and A. Fremont. “Transformation of Port terminal Operations: From the Local to the Global.” Transport Reviews 25, no. 1 (2005): 117-130

[14] Updated News. “St. John’s harbour fence necessary for port security, says mayor.” updatednews.ca. December 10, 2012. http://updatednews.ca/2012/12/10/st-johns-harbour-fence-necessary-for-port-security-says-mayor/ (accessed December 10, 2012).

[15] Updated News. “St. John’s harbour fence necessary for port security, says mayor.” updatednews.ca. December 10, 2012. http://updatednews.ca/2012/12/10/st-johns-harbour-fence-necessary-for-port-security-says-mayor/ (accessed December 10, 2012).

[16] Rodrigue, J-P., C. Comtois, and B. Slack. The Geography of Transport Systems. London: Routledge, 2006.

[17] Stopford, M. Maritime Economics (Second Edition). London: Routledge, 1997.

[18] Allen, C.H. Maritime Counterproliferation Operations and the Rule of Law. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007.

[19] Allen, C.H. Maritime Counterproliferation Operations and the Rule of Law. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007.

[20] Allen, C.H. Maritime Counterproliferation Operations and the Rule of Law. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007.

[21] Cristopher, Kenneth. Port Security Management. New York: Auerbach Publications, 2009.

[22] Cristopher, Kenneth. Port Security Management. New York: Auerbach Publications, 2009.