Quality Management Review of Volkswagen Emissions Scandal, Research Paper Example

Introduction

Volkswagen (VW) is a German engineered automobile who made their first United States appearance in 1949 with the VW Beetle and developed a recognized reputation as an inexpensive, reliable and well-built vehicle. In addition, Volkswagen became a dominant automotive market force throughout the 1960’s. Starting from the 1970’s, the VW Beetle had began to suffer a drop in sales and would expand into different car lines (Wilhelm, 1997).

Problem Statement

September 18, 2015 marked the day the VW world became chaotic.  The administrators of Volkswagen Group received a notice of violation from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).  According to the EPA, VW “developed and installed emissions control system defeat devices in model year 2009-2015 2.0-liter diesel light duty vehicles, which resulted in real world NO_x emissions that are a factor of 10 to 40 above EPA the complaint levels” (Barrett, et al., 2015, p.  114005). The problem statement explored the manner by which the Volkswagen group could remedy the situation with the minimal amount of damage to goodwill and brand.

Literature Review

Over a decade ago, segments of the Volkswagen group intended to procure the Mercedes Blue Tech matrix for the administration of the automobile pollution emission systems.  There had not been a consensus about the application of the Mercedes Blue Tech systems among the members of the Volkswagen Group consortium.  As a result, the plan for the application of Mercedes Benz components in order to administration the Volkswagen emission systems had not been ratified.  The members of the Volkswagen Group perceived that it would have been more favorable to develop their proprietary emission control systems (Coglan, 2015; Fellows and Monday, 2015).

Consequently, during the 2009 model year, the automobiles included an electronically administered mutual rail direct injection matrix, which operated in tandem with the Bosch elevated pressure pump.  The Volkswagen Group initiated changing its light service vehicles, which included the turbocharged, and diesel engines to the mutual rail fuel injection matrix.  The matrix enabled the fuel delivery with a higher level of accuracy.  The enhanced fuel delivery accomplished the application of an elevated injection pressure electronically administered fuel injectors.  As a result, the system derived improved fuel atomization, while enhancing administration of the fuel to air mixture with an increased air management system (Gevin, 2015).

There had been an aggregation of the diesel emission systems in order to manage the emission of soot and on specific vehicles an exhaust system that treated the urea content.  Consequently, Volkswagen Group had promoted the engines as being more stringent concerning the adherence of the air pollution emission controls.  The Volkswagen Group vehicles from the 2009 model year apparently surpassed the criteria established in the United States and the State of California.  Simultaneously, while apparently conforming to the emission standards established by the EPA, the Volkswagen vehicles did not sacrifice performance (Hankel, 2015: Joo & Joo, 2015).

In actuality, the Volkswagen vehicles produced since 2009 did not produce efficient fuel economy with nitrous oxide emissions that were compliant with the laws established by the EPA.  The 2009- 2015 Volkswagen vehicles have the ability of calibrating the vehicles during the emissions tests and fulfilling the criteria set by the EPA during emissions examinations.  The distinction between the operational emission and the testing emission was deliberately established.  Moreover, more than thirty of the administrative personnel at Volkswagen Group were aware of the calibrated emissions system regarding testing (Joo & Joo, 2015).

The emission recorded by the examination centers during the emission testing process were the causal attribute of the vehicles produced by Volkswagen Group winning the ¨Green Vehicles of the Year¨ award (Joo & Joo, 2015, p. 51).  This award became void in October 2015.  The cars produced from 2010 to 2015 applied counterfeit calibration settings in order to receive green emission awards.  The vehicles received scrutiny and the European Commission Joint Research Panel performed additional tests.  The report discovered that all of the diesel fuel vehicles have soot emission levels that are approximately 0.93 ± 0.30 grams per kilometer.  This quantity was in excess of the criteria of 0.62 ± 0.19 grams per kilometer.  As a result, the European Commission published an alert.  The alert stated that the electronic parts and the sensors, incorporated on the conventional light service vehicles, have the capacity of determining the initiation of an emission examination (Joo & Joo, 2015).

Consequently, there was a deactivation of certain operational modes of the vehicle during the laboratory tests.  The detection of air pollution emission is challenging from the legislative perspective.   The challenge is the premise that the technology applied in the vehicles may enable the carburation of the vehicles at different emission levels for testing.  The law forbids the application of the defeat mechanism during emissions testing.  Notwithstanding, there are cases where the defeat devices are applied in order to provide protection for the vehicles during day-to-day operation.  This quality provides a grey area regarding the review of emission production (Verchick & Steinzor, 2015).

There was a discrepancy between the European governance and the European commission regarding who would have the responsibility of enforcing the law.  In the United Kingdom, a report received by the Department of Transportation received review regarding the challenge of the actual compliance of the nitrous oxide emission concerning diesel fuel vehicles.  As an outcome of the stringent standards applied in the United Kingdom, the amount of breathable particles which have dimensions of PM₁₀ (10 µm) has been cut by 50% since the beginning of the century (Wilson et al., 2015).

The testing, which had taken place in the United Kingdom and the European Union, derived increased testing in the United States.  Studies at the University of West Virginia regarding the emission produced on the Volkswagen Passat and the Volkswagen Jetta showed higher than normal emission levels.  In addition, the BMW X5 received evaluation.  There had been a break in mileage of approximately 2,400 kilometers on the vehicles prior to testing on all three vehicles.  The BMWX5 tested at emission level that fulfilled or surpassed the standards established by the EPA (Verchick & Steinzor, 2015).

The Volkswagen Jetta and Volkswagen Passat had vehicle emission levels, which surpassed the emissions limit by five to twenty times.  The researchers who conducted the tests in at the University of West Virginia had not been able to identify the air emissions testing defeat component.  However, the outcome of the report received notice from the CARB and the EPA during the month of May 2014 (Verchick & Steinzor, 2015).

Analysis

The vehicles produced by Audi and Volkswagen categorized as emission violators were confirmed to comply with the criteria set by the United States EPA second Tier / Bin 5 level standard or the emission standards which had been established by the California regulations.  Each of these respective standards has the requisite that the nitrogen oxide emissions do not pass 0.043 grams per kilometer for motors, which have a complete useful lifecycle.  The useful lifecycle for the engines during the 2014- 2015 model year is 190,000 kilometers.  The criteria for the emissions of nitrogen oxide in the United States are among the most exacting requisites in the world.  The emission required for the fulfillment of the United States criteria are five times as strict as are their European counterparts.  In addition, the use of the defeat devices is unlawful in the United States and the European Union (Barrett et al., 2015; Wilson et al., 2015).

A violation notice sent to the administrators of the Volkswagen Group became the subject of attention.  The notice accused that more than 450,000 Audi and Volkswagen vehicle produced during 2009 – 2015 had the emission defeat testing devices incorporated.  The Volkswagen defeat component is a particular written firmware implementation that determines the length of the engines acceleration, the vehicle speed and the positioning of the steering wheel.  The standards almost fulfill the EPA emissions criteria, which enables the vehicle to satisfy the requirements for the testing.  The issue with the Volkswagen group is that when the vehicles are not being examined in laboratory conditions, the emissions produced are more than twenty times the amount permitted by the environmental regulations (Coghlan, 2015).

Recommendations

The recommendation would be that the administrators of the Volkswagen Group confess to their vehicles having technical problems.  The accusation is that administrators at Volkswagen had intentionally circumvented the law.  This is damaging to the reputation of the Volkswagen group and the industry as a whole.  The most potentially damaging allegation is that of official misconduct.  The administrators should make apologies and recalls prior to the United States Environmental Protection agency taking action against the Volkswagen group.  The CEO of the Volkswagen group should take responsibility for the malfunctioning of the firmware (Joo & Joo, 2015).

Consequent to the Volkswagen emission scandal, the CEO, Martin Winterhorn resigned.  The decision to implement the firmware was with criminal intent.  The Board of Directors admitted that they gained cognizance of the problems shortly after the media.  Volkswagen has conveyed knowledge of more than 11 million vehicles affected by the firmware that defeats the emissions testing.  In addition, Volkswagen group has declared that more than $7 billion is associated with the expenses associated with the rectification of the software that caused the vehicles to calibrate prior to emissions testing.  The recently appointed chief of Volkswagen Group, Matthias Müller averred that only a portion of the 11 million vehicles has the emission calibration software installed.  In addition, the new Chief Executive Officer stated the number of vehicles has not yet been determined-. In 2007; Bosch supplied the software for the emissions testing and advised the upper management at the Volkswagen Group that it would be unlawful to apply this type of software during the emissions’ testing process (Evans & Lindsay, 2014; Fellow & Monday, 2015).

Reflection

The actions of the upper management at the Volkswagen group has affected millions of people and vehicles.  The vehicles affected are all of the vehicles that are associated with the Volkswagen brand.  This includes Skoda, Audi and Seat.  In Germany, there will be a recall of 2.8 million cars and an additional 1.2 million cars in the United Kingdom.  The reports may not have the requisite of an extensive recall; nevertheless, the repairs will require the free labor.  In addition, the administrators at Volkswagen group discovered that the vehicles affected by the firmware emission-defeating device, would have challenges affecting the vehicles’ fuel consumption.  These have been vehicles outfitted with motors of 1.4, 1.6 and 2.0 liters in engine displacement.  The motors, which Volkswagen produced, are in the Skoda, Seat and Audi lines.  Considering the peripheral damage caused by the firmware defeating system for the emissions testing, another expense totaling € 2billion is probable (Evans & Lindsay, 2014; Hankel.  2015).

In the United States, the regional Chief executive officer Michael Horn stated: “we’ve totally screwed up” (Massey, 2015).  These characteristics infer that the organization had been less than forthright with the EPA, the CARB and everyone else in the market.  In addition, Volkswagen made an announcement that the models with the 3.0-liter engines marketed in the United States from 2009 – 2015 had been equipped with the emission calibrating firmware.  These vehicles have been equipped with alternative exhaust administration mechanisms.  The software is legal to use in Europe for these models while prohibited in the United States.  Nonetheless, Volkswagen has made the decision to recall all of the 8.5 million vehicles in Europe that totals to more than 33% of the organization’s car deliveries.  In addition, on specific models the firmware had affected performance and fuels economy (Massey, 2015).

In a review of the 2015 Jetta TDI with the 2011 Jetta Sports wagon TDI, when the vehicles were placed in the emission-testing mode, the acceleration of the vehicles decreased from 9. 9 second for the 0 to 60 mph range to 10.5 seconds for the 0 to 60 mph range.  Furthermore, the fuel economy rating of the cars changed from 50 mpg to 46 mpg.  Although the fuel expenses may not be extraordinary, they are enough to distinguish the models when compared to their efficient rivals (Fellows& Monday, 2015). The emission scandal at Volkswagen may have hurt the brand and the consumer perception.  The organization has definitely increased expenses due to the potential recalls.  The best option for Volkswagen may be to disclose the coding for the firmware and enable their cars to operate without the firmware (Evans & Lindsay, 2014).

References

Barrett, S. R., Speth, R. L., Eastham, S. D., Dedoussi, I. C., Ashok, A…& Keith, D. W. (2015). Impact of the Volkswagen emissions control defeat device on US public   health. Environmental Research Letters,10(11), 114005.

Coghlan, A. (2015). The curious case of NO x pollution. New Scientist, 227(3041), 10-11.

Evans, J. R. & Lindsay, W. M. (2014). Managing for Quality and Performance Excellence (9th edition). Cengage Learning.

Fellows, G. K., & Monday, O. (10 November 2015) Smokestacks vs Tail-pipes: Putting Volkswagen’s emissions scandal in perspective. University of Calgary.

Gewin, V. (2015). Turning point: Daniel Carder. Nature, 527(7578), 401-401.

Hankel, A. (2015). Detected and Defeated. Quality Progress, 48(11), 12.

Joh, E. E., & Joo, T. W. (2015). The Corporation as snitch: The New DOJ Guidelines on prosecuting white-collar crime. Va. L. Rev. Online, 101, 51-51.

Massey, R.  (22 September 2015). ‘We’ve totally screwed up’ Volkswagen’s U.S. boss admits company fixed diesel tests as hundreds of thousands of UK motorists face having their cars recalled. Daily Mail.

Verchick, R. R., & Steinzor, R. (2015). VW and GM scandals show why regulation matters. The Hill.

Wilhelm, B. (1997). Platform and modular concepts at Volkswagen—their effects on the assembly process. In Transforming Automobile Assembly (pp. 146-156). Springer Berlin Heidelberg.

Wilson, N., Quigley, R., Mansoor, O., Smith, M., & Signal, L.  (20 November 2015). Mandatory regulation or self-regulation in the age of the Volkswagen saga. New Zealand Medical Journal, 128(1425): 6721