The Ethical Dilemma Involving the 1986 Challenger Case, Case Study Example

The following case involves the ethical dilemma involving the 1986 Challenger Case that was one of the greatest tragedies in the history of NASA.  In January 26, 1986, the Challenger was destroyed based on questions around the safety of the launch. The Challenger crew consisted of seven astronauts that include, scientists, aerospace engineers, and other specialty pilots that died in the explosion at launch at 11:40 am in the Kennedy Space Center. Within 73 seconds into the launch, the shuttle exploded as a result of an ignited main liquid fuel tank in one of the Solid Rocket Boosters. The NASA investigational commission’s report cited that the cause was a failure of the “O-ring” seal in the Solid Rocket Boosters’ fuel tanks right side. The faulty design of the sealed along with the cold weather on the launch let hot gasses through the joints that allowed the flames of the booster rockets to pass through the failed seal, which enlarged the small hole. As a result, the flames that were ignited continued to burn through the external fuel tank of the Space Shuttle Challenger. Ultimately through the support that attaches the booster to the side of the tank. Once the booster came apart and collided with the fuel tank, it pierced the side. Liquid oxygen fuels and liquid hydrogen from the booster and the tank mixed and ignited, which caused the Challenger to tear apart. The commission found that the failed sealant ring was at fault along with the officials at NASA that allowed the shuttle launch to take place, even as engineers at NASA voiced their concerns regarding the safety.

The tragedy of the Challenger explosion was based on moral ethics that hinged on the responsibility of the engineers and communication between the team and NASA management. NASA management was more concern with keeping to the schedule of the launch then to the safety of the crew. The engineers also had a part in not consistently stressing the importance of how the weather would affect the launch, and the severity of the how the O-rings would react in temperatures that weren’t tested. The cold weather affected the O-rings tremendously, and the engineers displayed an attitude of let’s see what happens instead of the morally ethical better safe than sorry. Due to the engineering design of the shuttle launch with the O-ring having a backup in place, the engineer team felt that if a failure were to take place than it would be unlikely for the backups to fail also. More despicably, NASA was aware of the design flaws in the backups being placed for redundancy rather than to act as a primary part, and that there was potential they could fail. In result, the ethical concepts that are brought up in the case are the professional responsibility of NASA; the lack of effective communication; the flight plan superseding the safety concerns, the apparent unsafe launch conditions, reliance on redundant emergency safety controls, and the ignorance by NASA of the known design flaws.

Professional responsibility is one of the main ethical issues that played a part in the Challenger disaster. The design engineers have the pertinent responsibility and expectation of keeping the management and other heads abrupt to the potential flaws in the designs. As well as to correct flaws in their designs, as their professionalism helps to keep the costs in line with the obtained resources needed to complete the projects. The design team and NASA have the responsibility of modifying the design of the O-ring, and keeping on the schedule of the launch. However, the time limits, and the pressure to remain on schedule caused much haste in rushing through to complete, while not considered the safety of the astronauts. Richard Feynman, believed that the Challenger’s management would have needed to listen to the concerns of the design team, but dismissed the issues. The SRB engineers has previously warned the management team at NASA about the potential problems with the O-rings; however nothing was done to correct the problems. While it easy to blame the engineers, management also played a critical part that placed time constraints and pressure to stay within the launch schedule. The deficiencies in the ethics of the management and the engineer highlight the lack of problem reporting requirements in their misrepresentation of criticality, and lack of adequate resources that were dedicated to the safety of the crew. There was a lack of authority, independence, and responsibility of the safety organization with contributed to the disaster.

Another ethical problems were the lack of effective communication between management and the NASA engineers. More importantly, Morton Thiokol that designed the Solid Rocket Booster, and the management was inadequate. Roger Boisjoly one of the engineers tatted that the meetings were intense customer intimidation, and that it was not conducive in developing an environment in which everyone was comfortable in expressing their concerns opinions. (Boisjoly, 1987)  More critically, the design team didn’t have accurate data on how the O-rings and the Solid Rocket Booster would react to cold temperatures. On the night before the launch, the temperatures fell to 18 degrees, and as the day of the launch the temperature was in its mid-30s. Many engineers naively believed that the boosters would still function, however, many were worried that the boosters would fail. The lack of effective communication on the engineer team of Morton Thiokol to convey their concerns to the management team at NASA contributed to the disaster. They were not confident in the ability to convince management to postpone the launch to another day where temperatures would be more favorable. The ground crews also played a part, as their lack of communication with management could not convey that the thickness of ice on the shuttle would affect the launch.  The ground crews used infrared cameras that recorded the temperatures on each part of the shuttled that stated 8 degrees on the Solid Rocket Boosters. The O-rings were not at all designed to function in such low temperatures, and this vital piece of information was never shared with the engineers of managers at NASA, because crews were only instructed to state the thickness of the ice.

The flight plan or schedule was also examined as this placed extreme pressure on the entire teams at NASA. The increase in the flight rate would decrease the ability for NASA to safely survey any urgent issues that were due to decrease in people dedicated to the launch schedules. The management team was also affected as they rush to judgment rather than listen to reason in delaying the shuttle launch due to safety concerns. The management team places greater important on keeping the launch schedule than the safety of astronauts. The NASA team unethically cut corners in their design, in their communication, and safety concerns with the conditions on the day of the launch. The management team could not come to a general consensus in the potential safety concerns of the temperature coupled with the design flaws of the O-rings posing major problems. The decision making of NASA, is one of the serious ethical problems within this case. As NASA chose to risks the lives of the astronauts despite request by some engineers to postpone, weariness over the temperature. The decision to postpone would have saved the lives of those astronauts that day. Just like when executives are aware that the heads of the corporation are cooking the books and do nothing, so did the design engineers that knew that there were flaws to the O-rings. The inspections from previously used SRB units pointed out to problems with O-ring sealing problems, however, they deemed the information, not critical, since the falsely placed confidence in the backup O-ring placed for safety control measure. The actual ignorance to the problems of the shuttle was critical cause to the crash. Roger Boisjoly was the main people that voiced concerns over the safety inspections that revealed the critical flaws in the O-rings design. Not only did he have objections, he wrote a memo to Morton Thiokol’s management addressing the concerns that if the problem is not addressing that it would potentially fail during launch.(Boisjoly, 1987) The Morton Thiokol responded by telling the team to investigate the issue. When informing the team at NASA, the team was instructed to not make the concern a critical point in fixing the problem. Boisjoly was not able to convey the severity of the nature during the meeting with NASA, and management pushed aside his concerns. So in seeing the events, all parties were aware of the flaw at least six months before the launch, all the while that Biosjoly continued to express concerns. (Boisjoly, 1987)  The team was pressured into providing supporting data to present to NASA to go ahead with the launch, and the result was catastrophic.

In viewing the chain of events and the ethical problems that were apparent in the actions of the parties involved, there were several times where each party could have acted in ethical and moral regard for the safety of the astronauts on the ill-fated launch. From the standpoint of the design engineer team that were in charge of the crafting the shuttle, they knew of the flaws, and they knew that the time constraints would place unneeded pressure to shy over concerns of safety. The NSPE Code of Ethics for Engineers states that, “As members of this profession, engineers are expected to exhibit the highest standards of honesty and integrity.” (NSPE, 2013) The course of action that the engineers could have taken were to be honest in their assessments and strongly voice their concerns over the matter of the design flaws, and safety concerns. One of the first rules of practices is, “If engineers’ judgment is overruled under circumstances that endanger life or property, they shall notify their employer or client and such other authority as may be appropriate.” (NSPE, 2013) While the engineers did express concerns to the management team, they should have instead went over their heads and talked to the executives directly. In the ethical choices of Roger Boisjoly and Morton Thiokol, they knew about the issues, and Boisjoly informed his company, and tried to inform NASA’s management team as well. He had the ethical responsibility and recourse in making the matters known, however, the team was pressured by NASA. After the tragedy, NASA had to streamline the reporting channels putting in place a Shuttle Program Management Structure, and a Shuttle Safety Panel that reported to the program manager. This was the best decision since the management team was incapable of being morally ethical to consider the safety of astronauts. For the engineer team to rely on the backup O-ring in case of failure, was an ethical fail, as they aware of the operational malfunctions of the O-ring.  The recourse that should have been taken by all involved was to delay the launch until the problems were corrected. It is not ethical to endanger the lives of others in case of a known safety concern. The NSPE outlines this, where they have an impact of the quality of life, and must be required to be dedicated to protecting the safety, public health, and welfare of all. (NSPE, 2013) When the lives of others are involved it is a part of the principles of common morality in which is to prevent evil or harm from occurring, tell the truth, and to rescue persons in danger.

In the case of Challenger, the parties involved did not follow the principles of common morality in which to protect people from harm. The management of NASA placed the dollar and their reputation over the lives of the seven astronauts lost. Even when people in the engineer team voiced their ethical duty in the safety concerns of the launch, there was a lack of communication that could have been helped if NASA established a better environment in which members could voice their opinions. This ultimately led to the ill-fated launch that could have been prevented if the members of the engineer team upheld to their code of ethics to report, and abstain from doing harm to impact the quality of life of the astronauts.

Bibliography

Boisjoly, Roger M. “Ethical Decisions — Morton Thiokol and the Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster.” American Society of Mechanical Engineers Annual Meetings. 1987. Web. 19 March 2014. http://www.onlineethics.org/cms/7123.aspx

National Society of Professional Engineers. “NSPE Code of Ethics for Engineers.” 2013. Web. 19 March 2014. http://www.nspe.org/resources/ethics/code-ethics

Scott, Jeff, Brown, Aaron. “Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster.” Aerospaceweb. 4 May 2003. Web. 19 March 2014. http://www.aerospaceweb.org/question/investigations/q0122.shtml