The Leader Brand: Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Research Paper Example

Turkey’s prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been touted as the most popular politician throughout the entire Arab world in the aftermath of the Arab Spring uprisings  in Libya, Tunisia, and Egypt that resulted in the dismantling of tyrannies therein. Indeed, it has been contended that Erdogan is the most admired non-Arab political leader since Saladin, who was a Kurd during the twelfth century who seized Jerusalem from the Crusaders. From a western vantage point, however, Erdogan is denounced for his persistent and clamorous Israel bashing, which is perceived as a brand of cynical populism in order to pander to the Arab world. Nonetheless, many experts believe that the Turkish prime minister’s popularity is significant and to an extent an inestimable asset to both the West and the Arab world. Erdogan proffers a political brand that is emblematic of the neo-Islamist Justice and Development Party in Turkey. This political brand has enabled Erdogan to maintain his power base over other more combative and sectarian Muslim leaders from Iran. The regional tensions between Turkey and Iran will dictate the contours of the Middle East in the near future as Arab nations seek to create a new democratic order that is divorced from despotic governments that are backed by western nations. Thus, Erdogan’s political brand has been tailored in order to galvanize both Arabs and the western world.

Turkey is characterized as a dynamic democracy with a vibrant economy that few Arabs believe supersedes the bigoted theocracy that characterizes Iran with regards to which nation should lead the way for reform. Erdogan’s popularity continues to skyrocket despite the fact that he sells a political brand in which he discursively frames his political agenda as a successful recreation of the sultunate that was in place during the Ottoman Empire. Such an ideology has enabled Erdogan to have overwhelmingly favorable ratings in almost every Arab country except Iran. Much of Erdogan’s popularity can be attributed to the anti-American sentiment that pervades the region. In 2009, U.S. president Barack Obama articulated a broad vision of American-Middle East relations within the Muslim world. In 2011, however, the U.S. virtually capitulated to Israel regarding the Arab/Israeli conflict pertaining the Palestine. Due to the fact that the U.S. has lost favor in the Middle East, Turkey as a member of the North Atlantic Trade Organization (NATO) and possibly be allowed into the European Union (EU), is the favored country in the Middle East to dictate the future of the region.

Erdogan and his political party have won three elections in a row, and he has gained more support with each passing election. During his reign as Turkey’s prime minister, Turkey’s economy has almost doubled per capita income while the size of the economy has almost tripled.  Moreover, he stripped the army of its draconian power, which is appealing to both liberals and Islamists in the Arab world alike. Within a new Arab dispensation, Islamism will be a critical component due to the fact that prior Arab regimes suppressed all dissenting opinions, which resulted in opposition groups to rally around Islamism and the mosque. The Turkish paradigm grafts Islamism into a pluralist order and decries the Iranian model which aimed at safeguarding so-called immobile vested interests under the umbrella of a divinely-ordained political order. Erdogan has effectively put forth a political brand that appeals to the opposition of despotic, theocratic governments in the region that are constructed on the pillars of political hierarchy and the suppression of dissidence. Turkey thus has emerged as a hub for the opposition to organize themselves by Erdogan selling his political brand as one predicated on modernization and pluralism and structured by a more liberal brand of Sunni Islamism so starkly contrasting from the theocracies evident in Iran and Saudi Arabia. Indeed, these Arab nations are structured and characterized by radical fundamentalism, absolute monarchy, and sectarianism rooted in Wahhabi ideology.

Erdogan’s political brand can further be understood through an assessment of his victory speech in the past municipal elections. Usually, political leaders who decry the use of social media in politics today are unlikely to be elected the leader of a democratic polity. Although Erdogan was not running for any position in the municipal elections, he still touted the results of the elections as a referendum for his leadership as Turkey’s prime minister. In this speech, Erdogan marginalized the contentions and methods of the opposition in a highly polarized fashion. He touted the need for national unity while he was in power while also delegitimizing the opposition. Moreover, Erdogan addressed the ongoing conflict that continues to take place in  Syria in a way that clearly reflected his capacity to both redefine and distill is goals for Turkey in the near future. He importuned the slogan of one nation, one state, and one flag in order to convey how he understood the concept of national unity as well as acknowledge the pluralistic composition of Turkish society. This discursive technique suggests that Erdogan embraced a political brand in which cultural pluralism was embraced and functioned under the auspices of him as their leader in a similar way to how the Ottoman Empire functioned and was structured. As such, this particular political brand embraced tolerance and diversity in addition to a steadfast loyalty to the primacy of the state.

This call for national unity eschews political dissonance that may germinate, rendering any and all disagreements as an attack on the Turkish state as he defined it. Thus, in this particular speech, Erdogan gave a warm welcome to the supporters of his political party in addition to the public at-large in attendance while demonizing those who he called acted as guarantors of foreign interests. In addition, the prime minister depicted the opposition in Turkey as depraved traitors who did not have any integrity, juxtaposing them with animals who inhabit in the lairs. He pinpointed more specifically the Gulen movement, which formerly was a political ally of his that refers to a community that was clustered about a cleric who lived in the United States. Within the Muslim mobilization was taking place in Turkey, Erdogan asserts that a chasm formed between the two major political forces and decried the so-called Pennsylvania movement as hypocritical liars who used the media to discursively frame his regime in a pejorative fashion. Because Erdogan pursued the neo-Islamist Justice and Development Party’s original claim to power as the victims of elitism and the underdogs in the political structures in Turkey. As such, he promulgated his victory against the contemptuousness of persons who refused to trust the will of the people. In addition, he pinpointed the opposition to his regime as those who lacked any political acumen or meaningful policy proposals, thereby wasting the time and money of constituents with their frivolous political campaigns. In this manner, Erdogan branded the victory of his own party as an Ottoman slap to the trivial opposition against him.

The last topic Erdogan broached in his speech was the current conflict Turkey is embroiled in Syria, which erupted in a bitter and contentious civil war in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. The prime minister made several remarks that heralded and forecasted the casualties of the war with Syria. Doing so indicates that he steadfastly supported expansionistic policies in the region that were belligerent in nature. Erdogan elided any meaningful discussion of his other major foreign policy endeavors in the Crimean region, Palestine, and Egypt, all of which exacerbated the isolation of Turkey within the region while also further detracting from the credibility of the prime minister. It is thus clear that Erdogan branded himself as a leader concerned more about regional and global posturing than he was with domestic context. Branding himself as a leader of the majority  enabled Erdogan to eliminate the end of corrupt, opposition methods. The electoral success of Erdogan exposes the inefficacy of his primary opposition comprised of both right and left-leaning nationalists who feel entitled to be in power because they tout themselves as the progenitors of the anti-imperialist coalitions. Moreover, the ultra-nationalist who lean to the right on the political continuum embrace an ideology in which the Turkish race and nation are rendered superior. Such opposition posturing aligned in order to turn the tide against the Erdogan regime. The opposition further sought to exploit Erdogan by framing him and his regime as corrupt by releasing tapes that were recorded reportedly providing evidence that he was involved in money laundering schemes. This method is weak in comparison to an approach in which they underscored how Erdogan eroded the freedoms and rights of the citizens in addition to the poor economic plan put in place. As such, Erdogan branded himself as a politician who possessed greater acumen than his opposition because the opposition failed to spell out specific plans for economic and political reform, which is why they focused on so-called breaches of privacy. As such, it is clear that regardless of the opposition’s smear campaigns against him, Erdogan still maintains a strong conservative support base.

It cannot be ignored that the conservative base in Turkey supports Erdogan and his regime regardless of their regional or class backgrounds despite the fact that he was an authoritarian leader. The way that Erdogan brands himself, however, eschews any intimation that his supporters are brainwashed and drawn to him due to intrinsic irrationality or emotionality. Conservatives often structure their lives in accordance with religious sentiment, which often results in their alienation and subsequent suppression by the state if the state is governed by secular notions as is evident within Turkey. Indeed, historically, conservative communities in the country have been unable to openly convey their religiosity as well as their various practices in the public arena due to the fact that there is constant surveillance at the behest of the state. As a result, fervent Muslims feel victimized by the modern Turkish state if the state legislates how they practice their religion as well as their mobility in public. As such, Erdogan, despite the despotic nature of his leadership, brands himself as tolerant of practicing Muslims through the legitimation of their public visibility. As such, he appeals to the majority of the Turkish population through such tolerant attitudes, thereby fomenting their sense of gratitude towards him and thus their political support. Moreover, religious constituents enjoy access to both economic and political clout. Such entrenched fear and anxiety of being stripped of their public visibility in addition to their status and power all undergird why Erdogan has achieved such escalating rates of political support. Conservatives in Turkey remain steadfastly loyal to the state and evince an ardor for nationalism that Erdogan time and again preached about. It is this fervor for the nation and state that conservatives eschew staging anti-government protests throughout the history of the Turkish Republic. It is this political branding by Erdogan as tolerant of cultural pluralism and pro-Islamist in spite of the allegations of state-sponsored manipulation and diffuse corruption that enhances the appeal of his leadership and his regime as a whole. This popularity could only be amplified through the passage of effective economic reforms that bolstered populism while also providing stability for an oscillating financial market that has historically plagued the Turkish economy. Such economic stability blunts the haunting memories of past regimes who failed to address the needs of both the rural and urban poor. As a result of the economic stability, it makes sense that conservative members of Turkey are willing to turn a blind eye to the corruption that the opposition underscored in their campaigns.

In conclusion, Erdogan’s cogent political branding through the vilifying of his opposition in addition to the promoting cultural diversity, tolerance, and economic stability despite historical trends. Indeed, Erdogan’s opposition relied strongly on the sensationalism of the manipulation and corruption that the Erdogan regime was involved in. This opposition is comprised of a coalition between left-wing and right-wing nationalists that is representative of the majority of people in Turkey, yet Erdogan, despite heading a despotic regime, branded himself via public speeches and social media as a populist leader. Moreover, he conveyed his dexterit in linking the members of his conservative power base with the collective memories of victimization in addition to the social distress in the past as a result of government suppression. Erdogan was able to translate semiotics in relation to the collective state—which range from religious scarves to other religious manifestations that have historically been suppressed in public by secular state governments—into critical political abutment which fortified the efficacy of his political leadership. His ability to brand himself seemingly as a  populist leader is reified by his ability to familiarize himself with the struggles, values, and ideals with the Turkish constituents. By proffering a discourse of victimhood despite the fact that he was the subject of political scandals enabled him to brand himself as a man of the people who was also victimized by a coalition who conspired at the global level to drive him out of power. By juxtaposing himself as a victim in the same way that the Muslims in Turkey have historically been victimized undergirded his political branding and translated into constant success within the context of modernity.

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