Timely Involvement of Military Troops, Case Study Example

The current situation of natural disaster management in US is inefficient and segmented. Even the amendments made to the Insurrection Act in 2006 could not improve the situation. Posse Comitatus Act remains the main obstacle on the way to effective and timely management of large-scale natural disasters.  The changes expanded President’s right to use armed forces, including National Guard, not only under conditions of “insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy, but also under conditions of natural disaster” (Dougherty 2008, p 3). This measure could be applied only if all local and state resources were exhausted and did not result in the situation’s complete resolution (4). Such approach is partial and ineffective due to a couple of considerations.

First of all, use of the armed forces after exhaustion of state and local resources would not contribute to the improvement of disaster management. One of the main reasons for the disaster management failure is a lack of immediate first response assistance in restoring law and order (Craw 2007, p 844). Law enforcement conducted by the local police and militaries in the first days of disaster would ease further maintenance of order, distribution of aid and assistance, and decrease possible crime rate to the minimum (Dougherty 2008, p 48). On the other hand, prevention of criminal activity during the disaster would decrease the overall affords and resources used by local, state and federal authorities to deal with the consequences of looting, raping and killing. In case of Hurricane Katrina, civil disturbances were taken under control after interference of military forces. If military troops had interfered before, criminal activity would be nipped in the bud.

Secondly, putting an equal emphasis on the National Guard and armed forces is not sufficient. National Guard can be used by the federal government on the request of state and local authorities, but its efficiency is quite doubtful. In order to get to its full readiness, National Guard units have to be summoned and formed into groups, only than they can be assigned certain activity. They usually lack essential equipment and training for the immediate reaction in the field (Craw, 2007, p 849).  During the Hurricane Katrina, National Guard troops arrived into the area only three days after the landfall (Craw, 2007, p 849). During a natural disaster, immediate reaction and first response are crucial for successful management of the situation. US armed forces are mobile, in full readiness for the immediate actions and are well-supplied (Dougherty 2008, p 47). In contrast to the opponent’s opinion that military forces differ from the civil law enforcement and cannot conduct provision of the order under civil circumstance, US military troops are trained and already “perform domestic law enforcement and policing function” in other countries, like Iraq and Afghanistan (Craw, 2007, p 853).

Finally, the mechanism of disaster management and cooperation between local, state and federal authorities remains imbalanced, and it would slow the process of decision-making in the system offered in amendments. It is not specified until which extent the disaster should develop in order for the President to involve armed forces, and under which conditions local and state resources would be exhausted. If 2006 amendments existed during the Hurricane Katrina, they would not improve the situation much. The local and state authorities would still have to deal with disaster on their own, and ask for aid later, and militaries would be involved as the last resort, which is practically the same scenario as it happened in 2005. In order to make suggested application of armed forces in the management of natural disasters effective, they should be use as a primary source of law enforcement together with police officers and National Guard. In order to avoid misperception and irrelevant political manipulations, a separate Natural Disaster Act should be adopted, as a statutory exception of the Posse Comitatus Act (Craw, 2007, p 857). This Act would “provide a structure and mechanism for timely reaction to large-scale natural disasters and would help to prevent the human catastrophe of Katrina in future” (Craw, 2007, p 857).

References

Craw, A.J. (2007). A Call to Arms: Civic Disorder Following Hurricane Katrina Warrants Attack on the Posses Comitatus Act. 14 Geo. Mason Law Review. 829 – 857.

Dougherty, C. (2008). “Necessity Hath No Law”: Executive Power and the Posse Comitatus Act. Campbell Law Review, vol. 31, no 1, Fall 2008. pp 1-50.