Defining the Female Reality, Application Essay Example

In her article, “What Is Feminist Ethics?”, Hilde Lindemann goes a very long way to reveal that there is no single or definitive answer to her question. The work is, in fact, a carefully constructed exercise in negation; in instance after instance, the ordinary definitions of feminism, being a woman, and eventually ethics itself are examined and shown to be lacking. The examinations affirm some truth to the existing ideas, yet each element provides Lindemann with ample opportunity to illustrate problems in each, just as the standard idea of each creates difficulties in a true understanding of the next. After extensive investigation of these issues, Lindemann comes to the conclusion that, as feminist ethics are a norm and not a fact, the degree of ideological confusion is not only explicable, but inevitable. Ironically, Lindemann’s thinking traces a trajectory of the components of her subject only to leave her own basic question unanswered.

Lindemann writes in an engaging and accessible style, and she begins with an anecdotal introduction which delves into the essential problems in probing any sort of ethics at all. Using the metaphor of language, the author makes the point that the study of ethics, a normative field, is invariably distanced from any practice of ethics: “You have to know quite a lot about how to behave…before there’s much point in studying…ethics” (Lindemann 151). She then moves on to analyze, albeit briefly, the various ways in which feminism is perceived. Problems here stem from several issues, as in feminism being typically viewed as a movement only in relation to masculine dominance. This creates dilemmas within itself, as in ideas of gender equality reflecting a privilege of women which must be in place before any such movement can exist. There is as well the more complex, and virtually insoluble, issue of degree; if feminists seek equality with men, it must be acknowledged that men themselves present a vast range of levels of “equality,” in terms of basic capabilities. Adding to the confusion is Lindemann’s questioning of what a woman actually is, in terms of accepted definition. As with equality, she offers contrasting perspectives: a woman is defined as not a man, and also defined as the singular identity largely held to by average individuals. All of this leads Lindemann to her own conclusion, which is that feminism, and consequently the definitions necessary for its existence, is about power relations (154).

Moving into the sphere of gender, the author further asserts how power is the key component here. Lindemann discusses that gender is by no means the simple duality commonly accepted, and that there are those who do not neatly fall into even the biological definitions of male and female. This point of view assists the author in presenting the nearest thing to a stance she makes, which is how the norm dictates the definitions of all the subjects. Gender, for instance, is inextricably connected to all social markers, so there is no definition save that which is defined by the markers in individual circumstances: “Gender is the force that makes it matter whether you are male or female” (156), even as “gender” relies on those social and political elements giving it shape.

Having established that the issues of equality, ethics, and gender are intrinsically normative, Lindemann then proceeds to assert that feminist ethics itself must be normative as well. She emphasizes how, in any normative field, the thinking and the language go to optimal conditions, speculated upon on the basis of accepted description. This in turn leads to her discussion of why feminist ethics and feminist political theory are so difficult to isolate from one another; that is, the normative foundations of each exist to provide definition for both. Feminists, in Lindemann’s view, seem to require the political component of feminism because feminist ethics are otherwise too idealized, and thus lacking in substance. In essence, then, Lindemann’s article analyzes the primary elements of feminism itself, ranging from the basic nature of ethics to the power factor inherent in gender and feminism. In her view, the pervasive quality of the normative in all enables confusion of a kind, as the normative dependence on the ideal in ethics confronts the normative quality of gender, as well as gender equality. The result is that a carefully constructed article asking a question, namely as to what the precise nature of feminist ethics is, is unable to provide a true answer.

Works Cited

Lindemann, H. “What Is Feminist Ethics?” Normative Ethics. Ed. Shelly Kagan. Boulder:  Westview Press, 1997. 150-161. Print.