Partisan Preferences, Essay Example

Fundamentally, assuming Aldrich is correct, voters will vote in accordance with the option that they believe is most likely to serve their interests. The pursuit of public goods is the key driver here: different blocs of voters want different types of public goods (Aldrich 31). Public goods generally require some cost to be borne by the public for their provision, but they deliver certain benefits to everyone. For example, a candidate who reduces taxation ensures more money in voters’ pockets, but will also face a leaner budget with which to provide other public services.

The promise of public goods is fundamentally how politicians win votes in contemporary America: whether those goods consist of a commitment to a certain level of funding for schools, a fiscally conservative or liberal position on taxation, or a particular position on the abortion debate, all successful politicians come to power by promising voters a certain set of public goods (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 11). As Bueno de Mesquita and Smith explain, in democracies politicians need to provide better public goods than voters believe they can expect from politicians’ rivals (101). Politicians who fail to satisfy voters on this score can expect to lose office to their challengers, who will predictably exploit voter dissatisfaction with the incumbent by promising better public goods (101). In essence, to give a high-profile example from recent decades, this describes how Ronald Reagan defeated incumbent Jimmy Carter in the presidential election of 1980.

But according to Aldrich’s theory, this logic has a corollary: just as voters will often vote consistently along party lines because they expect politicians from their preferred party to deliver a better set of public goods than their rival politicians of the other party, so too politicians will affiliate themselves with whatever party they believe will give them the best chance of electoral victory (52-53). In many jurisdictions this is very easy to determine: in states that consistently lean red, such as Utah or Texas, the Republican Party is by far the likeliest party to deliver a strong electoral payoff. By contrast, in consistently blue-leaning states, such as Massachusetts on the East Coast or Oregon on the West Coast, the Democratic Party is by far the likeliest party to deliver a good electoral payoff. Of course, swing states like Ohio and Colorado are trickier, and so are historical time periods of considerable social and political ferment, like the Civil Rights Era. As Aldrich explains, under such conditions it may actually be in a candidate’s best interest to switch parties: many candidates have done so, with varying degrees of success, and many more have considered doing so (52-54).

From this, it follows that if one were to seek to test Aldrich’s predictions regarding voters, it would become necessary to first, ascertain what issues matter to voters, and concomitant with this, what public goods they desire. This is by far the most foundational thing: before one can have any idea about how likely voters are to vote for either one of the two major parties, or whether or not they are likely to penalize someone for switching parties, one must know what the voters care about. Again, voters vote in order to try to put into power candidates whom they believe will best represent their interests—or at the very least, will represent their interests better than the candidates’ rivals. If one can ascertain what public goods they would like, then one can better ascertain what a candidate is likely to have to promise them in order to take office.

Morton explains that this is exactly how George W. Bush won the Texas gubernatorial election of 1994, while his brother Jeb Bush lost the Florida gubernatorial election that same year. Both brothers had very similar conservative positions on the core issues: “welfare, education, and crime” (48). However, they ran their 1994 campaigns very differently. Jeb Bush ran his campaign on these issues: in essence, his was an ‘identity campaign’ or an ‘issues campaign.’ Jeb Bush “made no effort to appeal to moderate voters or minority voters who were worried about the effects of these policies on them” (48). In one particularly notorious gaffe, Jeb Bush, when asked by a black man about what Jeb Bush would do to help him, “Bush replied, ‘Probably nothing’” (48).

George W. Bush, on the other hand, made a concerted effort to court minority voters and moderate voters both: “He received an endorsement from a coalition of about 40 Dallas-area African-American, Asian-American and Hispanic entrepreneurs, lawyers, and executives”, and even accused his opponent “of giving less than 1% of state purchases and contracts to black owned business and promising greater support for minority businesses” (Morton 48). George W. rode this strategy all the way to victory in Texas, while his brother Jeb lost in Florida. However, Jeb took heed, learning from his brother’s example. In 1998, Jeb defeated Democratic candidate Lieutenant Governor Kenneth H. McKay, Jr., precisely by seeking out and courting minority voters, especially conservative-leaning black and Hispanic voters (48). In particular, many of these socially conservative minority voters were disaffected with Florida Democrats on the issue of abortion, something the conservative Jeb turned to his full advantage (48). He also was at pains to emphasize policies that would appeal to a broader cross-section of Florida’s electorate, by bringing in moderate voters (48). In 2002, Jeb was successful in a bid for reelection: despite having lost the support of much of the Florida black community due to the policies that he actually carried out while in office, Jeb was able to secure reelection because of his strong support among both moderate whites and Cuban Americans (48-49).

Accordingly, the survey should begin by asking voters a number of questions about their positions on such hot-button issues as taxation, funding for social services i.e. social safety nets, funding for education, law and order, gun control, abortion, marijuana legalization, gay marriage, and the like. The importance of these questions is that they will enable the researchers to figure out a great deal about the values that particular voters hold, and their position on the role of government in the lives of citizens. Political advertising should be taken into account here: how are the candidates of the respective parties attempting to smear each other?

While riddled with distortions, political advertising is nonetheless very useful for ascertaining what voters truly care about (Ansolabehere and Iyengar 5). A bid for office on conservative positions, for example, is likely to look different in a more conservative state like Utah, as opposed to a much more mixed state like California, which has had both Republican and Democratic governors even in recent years. Whereas a California Republican, for example, might wish to market themselves as a conservative centrist, attacking their opponent as an ‘extreme’ liberal, a Utah Republican will likely be compelled to be much more conservative if they wish to succeed. Likewise, bids for office on the basis of liberal positions are likely to look different in liberal-leaning states like Washington, as opposed to California, or historic swing states like Colorado, New Mexico, and Ohio. Ipso facto, a Washington Democrat will probably have to be, on average, more consistently liberal in their positions than a counterpart in Colorado, or New Mexico, or Ohio, who is likely to have much more to fear from Republican candidates by way of competition.

Thus, by ascertaining voter positions on hot-button issues, the survey will be that much more capable of ascertaining where the political center is likely to be: does the jurisdiction as a whole lean heavily to the left or right, or is it much more in the middle, though perhaps still definitively to one side? From this, the next step in the survey follows rather logically: the next step is to ask voters to identify the primary associations they make with both parties. Many voters may feel that neither the Democrats nor the Republicans really represent their own personal values, but they are likely to have an opinion as to which of the two parties is more representative, or at least more nearly representative, of their beliefs and values.

As Issenberg explains, it is naïve to expect people to be perfectly rational when it comes to politics: subjective and highly emotional associations are likely to color peoples’ decisions in the voting booth. If fiscally conservative voters feel that a Democratic candidate will tax them ruthlessly in order to fund ‘entitlements’ and ‘hand-outs’, then they are likely to vote against that Democratic candidate. Similarly, if socially/politically liberal voters feel that a particular Republican candidate’s fiscal policies will callously slash much-needed aid to vulnerable populations, i.e. low-income individuals, the homeless, and the mentally ill, then they are likely to vote against that Republican candidate. The key word in both cases is feel: very often, voters vote on the basis of identity as much as, if not more than, anything else (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 101, Issenberg 72-75, 96). In both cases, it may even be the case that some cross-section of the voters in question might actually rethink their voting decision if they sat down and considered enough arguments for and against the positions of the candidates in question. But all too often, politics doesn’t work this way: voters of the right and the left both vote for candidates about whom they feel certain things, even if they might actually reconsider at least some of their positions if they actually made a more concerted effort to examine them critically.

As Issenberg explains, conservatives long scorned Democrats on the grounds that the party was “beholden to unions and other identity organizations” (96). However, Reagan won the election of 1980 precisely because in the late 1970s, Republican Party strategists realized that they had to take a page out of the Democrats’ book, and increase support from key constituencies. Reagan defeated Jimmy Carter with the support of this patchwork quilt or bricolage of constituencies, which had coalesced into a united, Republican-voting confederation: “religious true believers, free-market enthusiasts, military loyalists committed to a hawkish foreign policy” (96).

The lesson for the survey could not be more clear: the survey must ask voters how they perceive both the Democratic Party and the Republican Party. Questions should include how the voters see the two parties comparing on issues like taxation, the environment, funding for social services, education, and other public goods, law and order, gay marriage, marijuana legalization, etc. They should also include questions about how the voters view the parties, whether negatively, positively, neutrally, or simply undecided/no opinion. Is the Democratic Party the party of the people, one committed to a more pluralistic and diverse America, or is it the party of the so-called “tax-and-spend liberals”? As Bueno de Mesquita and Smith explain, the Democratic Party is consistently the party that supports more taxpayer-funded social services, compared with the Republicans (19). The reason for this is that these social services are the public goods that Democratic voters consistently want (19). Is the Republican Party the family values party and the anti-big-government policy, concerned with safeguarding traditional values and citizens’ paychecks, or is it the party of plutocracy, greed, and narrow-mindedness? As Bueno de Mesquita and Smith explain, the Republican Party is consistently the party that most opposes higher taxes, notably on the top-most brackets, and also most opposes taxpayer-funded national health care (19). The reason for this is just as straightforward as it is for the Democrats’ decision to support more social safety nets: Republicans, like Democrats, need to deliver the public goods that their constituencies want (19). Thus, the answer to these questions will unquestionably depend on voters’ personal beliefs, which will determine which of the two parties they are more favorable to.

Once all of this has been ascertained, it is very clear what the final questions on the survey should be. Voters should be asked who they actually plan to vote for, and how this person compares with both 1) the voters’ own values, and 2) the party. For example, a right-leaning voter might find the Republican Party too centrist in general, but a particular candidate might appeal to them as a refreshingly conservative candidate, with (to give common examples) conservative positions on abortion, gay marriage, gun control, and taxation. Similarly, a left-leaning voter might find the Democratic Party too centrist in general, but a particular candidate might be refreshingly liberal, with (again, to give common examples) liberal positions on abortion, gay marriage, social welfare programs, funding for schools, taxation, and marijuana legalization.

Finally, the last questions should be: “If your preferred candidate were to suddenly switch parties just before the election, how likely would you be to change your vote, assuming no other information was available to you? What if your non-preferred candidate switched parties? What if both switched parties?” It is important to explain the reasoning for this question: if the candidate changes parties suddenly, just before the election, and no other information is available, the voter must rely on their assessment of the candidate’s character, including likeliness of switching positions, as well as their assessments of both parties. By so doing, the survey will ascertain the degree to which party affiliation really counts. If a candidate perceived as liberal switches to the party perceived as conservative, what will this do for liberal voters? For conservative voters? How much does the candidate’s reputation matter? By asking these questions, the survey will enable researchers to ascertain how deep party loyalties truly run.

Works Cited

Aldrich, John H. Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1995. Print.

Ansolabehere, Stephen, and Shanto Iyengar. Going Negative: How Political Advertisements Shrink & Polarize the Electorate. New York: The Free Press, 1995. Print.

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, and Alastair Smith. The Dictator’s Handbook: Why Bad Behavior is Almost Always Good Politics. New York: PublicAffairs, 2011. Print.

Issenberg, Sasha. The Victory Lab: The Secret Science of Winning Campaigns. New York: Crown Publishers, 2012. Print.

Morton, Rebecca B. Analyzing Elections. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2006. Print.