The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Essay Example

Karl Popper is regarded as a hero in philosophy by many scientists. His work has been recognized as an important element of modern-day science and has influenced many thoughts. Popper is recognized for his falsifications account, which is premised on the foundation that “a hypothesis is scientific if and only if it has the potential to be refuted by some possible observation” (Smith 58). The implication is that to consider a concept as scientific, it must be capable of being tested in the future and proven to be false. Thus, according to him, the knowledge of science that people hold today is provisional, meaning that it is only useful today but maybe refuted today. These are the premises of Popper’s account of science progresses. For example, when one hypothesizes that all swans are black, another may observe white swans and use that as the foundation to disprove the hypothesis. By developing the falsificationist account, Popper seeks to replace the classical positivist approach.

According to Popper, for there to be progress in science, the focus should be to disprove an existing hypothesis rather than continue it.  According to Popper, “the truth of a scientific theory can never be supported by observational evidence, not even a little bit, and not even if the theory makes a huge number of predictions that all come out as expected” (Smith 59). Since the truth of science cannot be proven, the only reasonable way to make progress is by seeking to disprove existing hypotheses through observations. Scientists can never entirely be sure that a scientific theory is true, and that is why it is always necessary to develop a skeptical approach to science.

In the Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Kuhn describes normal science as “research firmly based upon one or more past scientific achievements, achievements that some particular scientific community acknowledges for a time as supplying the foundation for its further practice” (Kuhn 21). Further, Kuhn describes these achievements as paradigms. According to Kuhn, it is not difficult to identify normal science. This is because the theories that may be classified as normal science have been accepted and published in a wide range of texts, both elementary and advanced. Although the texts may describe the theories in different ways, the reality is that they expound on or build upon these existing theories to develop other ideas.

Kuhn makes it clear that establishing paradigms is necessary for normal science to happen. The author mentions that the establishment of paradigms allows scholars to choose the field they want to specialize in and contribute to their advancement. Kuhn says that “men whose research is based on shared paradigms are committed to the same rules and standards for scientific practice” (Kuhn 23).  The author indicates that this commitment to a certain paradigm produces a commitment that acts as the foundation of normal science. In the end, the transition of one paradigm to another leads to the creation of normal and mature science. Thus, by monitoring the movements within paradigms, it is possible to determine whether or not there is progress in science.

When one looks at the features of normal science, it is evident that Popper’s falsifications approach may not accommodate some of them. For instance, Kuhn’s normal science holds that when there is a theory of science traditionally held by one or two scholars, it has been used and accepted by communities. As a result, it is used to develop some ideas. It then qualifies as normal science. This is a position that is untenable to Popper’s falsifications approach. According to the latter, science should aim at seeking to develop by questioning the existing theories. Science should not just accept theories developed by two or more people in the past and use them as the foundation of practices. These are positions that are significantly in contrast with the position of normal science. For instance, since many scholars accepted and referenced Newton’s Opticks, it is considered a normal science. However, following Popper’s falsification, scientific progress can only be made by disproving rather than seeking to confirm the theory. The implication of this is that Popper and Kuhn disagree significantly on what ought to constitute science. Kuhn feels that normal science is established when one or more scholars present scientific knowledge that is accepted and applied by many people, while Popper feels that scientific knowledge is established by challenging existing scientific theories.

In conclusion, Popper’s falsifications approach asserts that to consider a concept as scientific, it must be capable of being tested in the future and proven to be false. Thus, according to him, the knowledge of science that people hold today is provisional, meaning that it is only useful today but maybe refuted today. As a result, for progress in science, the focus should be seeking to disprove an existing hypothesis rather than continuing it. The position adopted by Popper is much different from that of Kahn, which suggests that the theories that may be classified as normal science have been accepted and published in a wide range of texts, both elementary and advanced. Kuhn makes it clear that establishing paradigms is necessary for normal science to happen. The establishment of paradigms allows scholars to choose the field they want to specialize in and contribute to their advancement.

Works Cited

Kuhn, Thomas. The structure of scientific revolutions. Princeton University Press, 2021.

Smith, Peter Godfrey. “Theory and reality: an introduction to the philosophy of science.” (2003).