Review of Miranda vs Arizona Prosecution, Case Study Example

“You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can and will be used against in court…you have the right to talk to a lawyer and have him or her present while you are being questioned. If you cannot afford…one will be appointed… ” This phrase is common among most drama and action movies involving the law enforcement agencies in the US. The events succeeding an ordinary arrest on suspicion of armed robbery changed the mode in which suspects are treated during custody and interrogation.

Miranda, born in 1941 was 22 years old when the law enforcement authorities arrested him for armed robbery charges. As postulated by Burgan (p 8-15), Miranda confessed to having abducted, raped and robbed a woman. The victim of the heinous offences later identified him based on audio and visual cognition. However, the claims of the woman were questionable due to her history of distorting facts, thus the arresting officers employed psychological stances to motivate Miranda to confess to their accusations. With the victim having identified him as well as medical evidence supporting occurrence of the offence, Miranda felt compelled to cooperate with the police (Sonneborn, 9-10).

During the interrogation process, the arresting offers did not outline the right to silence and representation. Since the suspect had a prior arrest record, the officers assumed that Miranda was well aware of his right to silence (Harr, 86). Through coercing Miranda to mouth a confession and attest to it by appending his signature, the arresting officers infringed on the right of the suspect thereby tampered with the judicial process ab initio. Armed with the confession of the suspect, the prosecution had an easy day in court since Miranda was convicted of rape and kidnap. Both crimes carried a sentence of 20 to 30 years apiece. Following the sentencing, Miranda filed an appeal to the U.S Supreme Court (Carmen, 404).

The Supreme Court overturned the ruling. Subsequent retrial without the confession led to conviction and sentencing of Miranda to 20 years in prison (Fridell, 15). In a rare twist of events, the judges in the case pinpointed the obligations of the arresting officers during the arrest. By reminding the suspected offender of their right, an officer is able to act within his mandated boundaries.

The law enforcement authorities are responsible for protecting the right of individuals, including suspected and convicted criminals as supplied by the constitution. However, courts and law enforcement agencies are mandated to uphold the judicial procedure and only designate guilt after proper trial. Thus, all suspects should be accorded the right to representation. The interrogation process should be structured in such a way that the individual does not self-incriminate.

Due to the precarious position the suspect finds himself or herself when under questioning, “the privilege against self-incrimination is in jeopardy” Carmen (p405). Thus during interrogation, if the officers proceed with interrogation without consent of the suspect, the state is obliged to prove that thee suspect knowing waived his right thereby implicating himself in the crime as asserted by Gaines and Miller (p228).

Crime investigations present a major challenge to the law enforcement authorities. The challenges have come in the way of execution of their role in the judicial system according to Wallentine (p105). However, with a clear line and outline of conduct, police officers are able to conduct meaning interrogations featuring confessions. By upholding this rule, the law enforcement and judicial machinery is able to uphold justice. By so doing, they protect the rights of the individual. The systems in place are foolproof and the judicial system has in most instances succeeded in facilitating the dispensation of justice.

The warnings subsequently referred to ‘Miranda warnings’ comprise directives to the suspect, given prior to placing an individual in custody as posited by Gaines and Miller (p237). A suspect has the right to remain silent and fail to respond to any questions asked. By so doing, the justice system aims at minimizing the instances of self-incrimination. Since the right to speech or silence is constitutional, arrest on suspicion does not warrant infringement into such a right. Of utmost importance is the fact that such a warning applies both in custody and during interrogation (Fridell p84 and Wallentine, p106).

A police officer has to pronounce to the suspect that his orations are admissible as evidence in court. As observed from the Miranda case, the investigating officer contravened constitutional rights when obtaining the evidence adduced. Thus, the validity of the evidence was compromised by the sole fact that it was based on an illegality. The suspect was not informed of the implications of his actions as postulated by Wallentine (p106), who posits that, “Prosecution may not use statements stemming form custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination”.

The right to representations is paramount in society. The judicial system operates in a model that is not familiar to individuals who are not privy to the proceedings. Thus, lack of representation accrues substantial disadvantage to the individual. In the case of Miranda, the accused was not aware of the process of investigating crimes and ended up providing the evidence that contributed to his conviction. If one is unable to afford counsel, the state is mandated to avail competent counsel, who has to act in utmost good faith.

As ambiguous as it seems, the warning serves to uphold the constitutional right of every individual. The recitation of this warning serves to advise the suspect of his rights in a bid to enable them make an informed decision regarding the case at hand (Fridell, 81). As a result, silence from the suspect or request for counsel provides ground for cessation of the grilling process.

Voluntary confessions are as admissible to a court of law as any other evidence as echoed by Carmen (p 404). As provided by the Fifth Amendment to the constitution, such evidence will provide basis for prosecution and sentencing. However, the individual has the right to know that such evidence will be used against him or her (Cole, 275). Such limitations legitimize the acquisition of evidence as well as circumvent interference to proper enforcement of the statutes.

For a confession to be admissible as evidence in a court of law, the prosecution has to prove beyond doubt that its acquisition was voluntarily. According to Fridell (p9) Trickery and deception as tools of interrogation are tolerable by the courts. Statements borne out of the need to incriminate the suspect are also admissible since they are not infringements on the rights of the individual. Such statements include advice that finger and foot print evidence at the scene matched characteristics of the suspect.

However, physical abuse and deprivation of basic needs renders any confessions involuntary (Wallentine, 130). By considering the entirety of the circumstances of the confession, courts are able to classify whether the confession was voluntary or involuntary. In the calibration of coercion, the courts asserted that a warning, (the Miranda warning), was sufficient to allude the element of compulsion.

According to Leo & Thomas (p 35), “no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness to himself”. By allowing such an incidence, the courts would be in contravention of the Sixth Amendment, through ratification of police investigations as criminal proceeding. Separation of roles would be compromised since law enforcement would overlap with prosecution, thereby compromising the judicial system. The warning is however subject to waiver by the suspect.

The Miranda case outlined procedures that have come under heavy criticism. As observed from some cases, the police are unable to obtain any admissible evidence without a confession. Since the guidelines in place limit their choices, some dangerous individuals have found their way back to the streets after lack of sufficient evidence. In the absence of rules relating to confessions, the state was under no obligation to respect the right of the suspected party according to Pohlman (p38). Most convictions prior to the Miranda case were based on evidence obtained because of physical torture of the individuals.

However, critics accuse the courts of laxity and in turn coddling outright criminals. As investigators, evidence adduced in court in the form of a confession should not be a product of coercion. Therefore, it is imperative that the client is warned of the consequences of responding to questions during the interrogation process as outlined by Carmen (p405).

Conclusion

The justice system is in place to uphold the laws of the land. In the best interest of the citizenry, all are considered innocent until proven guilty, in a competent court of law. As a result, evidence gathered by law enforcing agencies is solely for use in a court of law to establish guilt and not a sign of guilt in itself. As the home of justice, the courts and police cells should refrain from infringing on the supreme law of the land, the constitution. In spite of the scenario at hand, due process should be followed to rid the system of inaccuracies and ambiguities.

Works Cited

Burgan, Michael, “Miranda V. Arizona: The Rights of the Accused” Minnesota: Compass Point Books, 2006, p8-16

Carmen, Rolando. “Criminal Procedure: Law and Practice” California: Cengage Learning, 2006, p403-406

Cole, George and Smith, Christopher “The American System of Criminal Justice” California: Cengage Learning, 2006, p275

Fridell, Ron. “Miranda Law: The Right to Remain Silent Supreme Court Milestones” New York: Marshall Cavendish, 2005, p9-82

Gaines, Larry, K and Miller, Roger, L. “Criminal Justice in Action” California: Cengage Learning, 2008, p227-238

Harr, Scott and Hess, Karen “Constitutional Law and the Criminal Justice System” California: Cengage Learning, 2007, p 86

Leo, Richard, A and Thomas, George,” The Miranda debate: law, justice, and policing” Pennsylvania: UPNE, 1998, p35

Levy, Leonard,  “Seasoned Judgments: The American Constitution, Rights, and History New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1995

Pohlman. HL “Constitutional Debate in Action: Criminal Justice” Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005, p38

Sonneborn, L “Miranda v. Arizona: Supreme Court Cases through Primary Sources”  New York: The Rosen Publishing Group, 2003, p9-10

Wallentine, Ken. “Street Legal: A Guide to Pre-Trial Criminal Procedure for Police, Prosecutors, and Defenders Criminal Justice Section” Chicago: American Bar Association, 2007, p105-106